A GraphQL Authorization Misconfiguration is a critical security vulnerability where a GraphQL API fails to consistently and comprehensively enforce access controls across its operations and data models.
This oversight allows unauthorized users to access, modify, or delete information beyond their intended permissions, potentially compromising the entire system's security.
Key characteristics of this vulnerability include inconsistent access controls, where different queries or mutations for similar data have varying levels of authorization checks, an overly permissive schema that exposes sensitive fields or operations without proper restrictions and a lack of depth-limited queries, resulting in no mechanisms to prevent resource-intensive or overly nested queries.

### Implications

1. Unauthorized Data Access and Manipulation:
   - Attackers can retrieve sensitive information like personal user data, financial records, or proprietary business information.
   - Malicious users may alter or delete critical data, affecting system integrity and user trust.

2. Potential Privilege Escalation:
   - Exploiting misconfigured queries or mutations, attackers might gain administrative privileges.
   - Lateral movement within the system becomes possible, allowing access to other restricted areas.

3. Compromised System Integrity:
   - The reliability and accuracy of the entire dataset come into question.
   - Compliance violations may occur, especially concerning data protection regulations like GDPR or CCPA.

4. Data Exfiltration:
   - Large-scale data theft becomes feasible through carefully crafted queries.
   - Competitive intelligence or user databases could be extracted without detection.

5. Reputational Damage:
   - Public disclosure of such vulnerabilities can lead to loss of user trust and potential legal consequences.


### Code Example

=== "Python"
  ```python

    class UserType(DjangoObjectType):
      class Meta:
        model = User
        fields = ("id", "username", "email")

    class OrganizationType(DjangoObjectType):
      class Meta:
        model = Organization
        fields = ("id", "name", "users")

    class Query(graphene.ObjectType):
    all_users = graphene.List(UserType)
    organization = graphene.Field(OrganizationType, id=graphene.ID(required=True))

    def resolve_all_users(self, info):
      user = info.context.user
      if not user.is_authenticated:
        raise graphene.GraphQLError("Authentication required")
      return User.objects.all()

    def resolve_organization(self, info, id):
      try:
        org = Organization.objects.get(id=id)
      except Organization.DoesNotExist:
        raise graphene.GraphQLError("Organization not found")
    
      return org
  ```
In this example, note that even though the `Users Query` implements access control, the `Organization Query` does not.
Since the Organization Query exposes the nested users attribute, an attacker can use it to access information that was denied when queried directly.

Query Examples:
  ```graphql
  # Secure query
  query {
    allUsers {
      id
      username
      email
    }
  }
  
  # Vulnerable query
  query {
    organization(id: "123") {
      id
      name
      users {
        id
        username
        email
      }
    }
  }
  ```