This vulnerability indicates that the server is susceptible to DROWN attacks, which exploit SSLv2 support to decrypt modern TLS connections through cross-protocol Bleichenbacher padding oracle attacks.

DROWN (Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened encryption) occurs when servers support the obsolete SSLv2 protocol alongside modern TLS. Even if clients never use SSLv2, attackers can exploit SSLv2's weak RSA padding implementation to decrypt captured TLS sessions that share the same private key.

### How It Works:
1. Attacker captures hundreds of TLS connections between client and server
2. Using the same RSA private key, attacker connects to SSLv2 service on same/different server
3. Sends specially crafted SSLv2 handshake messages with modified RSA ciphertext
4. SSLv2 server responses leak information about private key through padding oracle
5. After ~40,000 probes, attacker can decrypt one of the captured TLS sessions

### Requirements:
- Target server or related server supports SSLv2 with same RSA private key
- RSA key exchange used in TLS connections (not ECDHE/DHE)
- Network access to capture TLS traffic and probe SSLv2 services
- Computational resources for cryptographic attacks ($440 on cloud)

**Example Scenario:**
A bank's HTTPS website properly disables SSLv2, but their SMTP email server on the same infrastructure supports SSLv2 using the same RSA certificate. An attacker captures customer TLS sessions to the website, then makes thousands of crafted SSLv2 connections to the email server. The weak SSLv2 padding oracle reveals enough information to decrypt the captured HTTPS sessions, exposing login credentials and financial data.

The attack exploits legacy export-grade cryptography restrictions from the 1990s, demonstrating how government-mandated crypto weakening continues to threaten modern security decades later.